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ROSCOE STEFFENi
ON October 14, 1953, Judge Medina handed down his opinion in United
States v. Morgan,' and granted defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint,
at the end of plaintiff's case, "with prejudice." The opinion was at once hailed
in the press, not only for its soundness, but for providing us with "a textbook
on investment banking" to boot: "a freshly vigorous approach to the subject
which, one may safely predict, will leave its impress for a long time to come on
every work in this field with even the slightest pretensions to scholarship."2
Even the court is reported modestly to have conceded that his opinion is "a
document of literary merit."3
The truth of Judge Medina's further remark, "There is going to be joy' 4
among the bankers, should probably go without saying. The defendants, as
their counsel told the court on many occasions, had long chafed under the
asserted unfairness of the Anti-Monopoly Investigation into their affairs, which
Congress conducted in 1939 and 1940.5 This investigation brought to light
for the first time many of the practices, and some of the evidence, upon which
the Morgan case was later brought. It does not appear to have been unfair in
any other sense.6 Witnesses were treated courteously; they had counsel pres-
1Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. The author was in charge of the Govern-
ment's case in United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), during the
investigational stages, and later, in the spring of 1951, took part in the trial. A reply to
Professor Steffen by William Dwight Whitney, Esq., one of defense counsel, vill appear in
a forthcoming issue of the YALE LAv JOURNAL,
1. 118 F. Supp. 621-832 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
2. Collins, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1953, p. 29, coL 5.
3. United Press report printed in the Chicago Daily News, Oct. 15, 1953. Judge Medina
is there reported also to have said: "My opinion is a complete history of the American
investment bandng business, and as an anti-trust opinion it is unique in that it does not
deal in generalities."
4. Ibi.
5. See TNEC, INvEsTIGATION OF CONcENTRATIO; or EcoNo uc PoWER (TNEC
Monographs 22-4,1940-1).
6. To the extent that defendant's claim of unfairness has any point, it rests upon the
committee's refusal to take evidence on the supposed evils of competitive bidding for securi-
ties, and concerning the practices of large institutions in buying directly from issuers, at
so-called "private placement." These were giving serious concern to defendant bankers,
who thought their way of doing business by private negotiation with the issuer, and with-
out price-competition, was more in the public interest. The committee decided, and it
would seem reasonably, that such matters were outside the scope of its immediate investi-
gation. For a comparison of the purchase of securities by "negotiation" and by "com-
petition," see ATKINs, EDWARDS, & MOULTON, THE REGULAIxN oF THE SEcumY MA Krs
99 et seq. (1946).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ent; they were permitted to answer questions fully and in their own way. By
post-1952 standards, 7 the Committee may have been guilty of "coddling" wit-
nesses, so to speak, but not of unfairness.
But the evidence did put investment bankers in a bad light, so far at least as
the antitrust laws are concerned. The joining of erstwhile competitors into
syndicates on an "historical" basis, the reciprocal granting of buying group
participations, all with no price-competition either in the purchase of securities,
or in their resale, seemed to fly in the face of the Sherman Act. Hence, Judge
Medina's holding undoubtedly was quite well received. No time was lost, in
fact, before several thousand copies of his opinion, which was 424 pages long,
were specially printed for distribution to issuer-clients and others.8 Here, at
last, was vindication, even though it might be short-lived.
Defendants must have known that there have been other long and quite as
scholarly trial court opinions, which have not survived appeal. Judge Caffey's
holding in Alcoa,' and that of Judge Stephens in the Gypsum 1o case, come to
mind. Perhaps the defendants took seriously Mr. Dooley's famous line about
law and the election returns. But, however that might be, Assistant Attorney-
General Barnes, after due consideration," decided to let the deadline pass for
filing an appeal. "We're not interested in taking an appeal on a lost cause," he
said. "We're not going to throw away money to justify a previous position
where the Government has, in the opinion of the trial court, overextended it-
self."
12
Thus, more or less by default, Judge Medina's holding has become the "law"
of the land, and in a very important segment of the economy. For it is vital to
legitimate enterprise that it have a completely free market in which to sell its
securities to investors. 3 No self-appointed group, however worthy its noo-
7. For example, those of McCarthy, Jenner, Velde, and Reece, in the present Congress.
8. Published by the Record Press, New York. Price to the public, $8.00 per copy.
9. United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 44 F. Supp. 97-311 (S.D.N.Y.
1941), rev'd, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 67 F. Supp. 397-517 (D.D.C. 1946),
rev'd, 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
11. The trial staff was unanimously in favor of an appeal, although they differed as to
scope. The appellate section, as is its wont, took a dim view of any appeal. When asked
his views, the writer submitted on March 8, 1954, well ahead of the deadline, a memoran-
dum favoring an across-the-board appeal substantially on the basis discussed in this paper.
12. Judge Barnes' comment, as reported in the Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1954,
p. 1, col. 3. It should not be taken, I am sure, as a matured statement of Antitrust Division
policy; in fact, it would seem to be faintly tinged with politics.
13. The Securities Act and related legislation was designed primarily to protect the
investor. There is no suggestion that the SEC was charged with Tesponsibility to enforce
the Sherman Act. The principal, if not the only, power of the Commission to bring about
competitive conditions in the industry was granted it by the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935. And the Commission exhausted its power in that regard, as the Com-
mission itself said in Release No. 3700, 11 SEC ANN. REP. 918 (1942), when it adopted
Rule U-50, requiring competitive bidding for the securities of those companies subject to
that Act.
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fives,14 may be permitted either to limit or to postpone access to that market.
or to clog its operation by restraints upon prices or methods of sale. And it is
not enough, or even relevant, that the banker can say that our economy has
developed and prospered in the past: it may well have done so, but at an tin-
warranted cost in terms of restraint of trade.
Fortunately, though, we are assured by Judge Medina-and Judge Barnes
concurs '--that there have been no improper restraints in the securities busi-
ness, or, at least, that Government counsel in the course of a long trial were
unable to show any. The matter is of such importance, however, that it is
proposed in what follows to look first to the charges, as precisely alleged in
the complaint, and then to examine carefully how the court disposed of them.
It may be that, instead of the Government having a "lost cause," its prima
fade case was actually fully established. Perchance the trial court ruled on
"some other case" than the one alleged in the complaint.'0
The Restraint of Trade Chargcd
The heart of an antitrust pleading-whether by indictment or complaint-is
the charging paragraph. This states in few words the nature of the offenses
charged. Where the offense is conspiracy in restraint of trade under Section 1
of the Sherman Act, the nature of the restraint, such as price-fixing,17 control-
ling distribution,' 8 dividing markets,1 or whatever, is briefly stated. Perhaps
the charging paragraph alone would suffice. But at least since the Swift case.20
it has been customary to precede the charge with a comprehensive description
of the industry and of the commerce alleged to be restrained, and to follow it
with a recital of some of the means by which the offense is alleged to have
14. The Supreme Court has said many times that good intentions are no substitute for
the declared policy of Congress. See, c.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States,
226 U.S. 20 (1912).
15. The Solicitor General, Judge Sobeloff, should perhaps also be included, since he
had the final responsibility.
16. It is a separate question, not discussed nor particularly important here, whether
the trial court's findings of fact are well supported. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
338 U.S. 338 (1949), and United States v. Oregon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952),
the Supreme Court made it plain that it is reluctant to go back into the record to deter-
mine whether a trial court has weighed the evidence as the appellate court would have
done. But manifest error of law is a horse of a different color. The Court should be par-
ticularly anxious, it would seem, to see to it that the standards used by the trial judge
were correct, even if this might require an extensive examination of the record.
17. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
18. Eastern States Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
19. United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
20. Swift & Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). See, particularly, the
language of Mr. Justice Holmes. Id. at 395-6. The Swift case vas much like the Morgan
case. Both dealt with alleged restraints upon distribution, beef in one case and bonds in the
other. The packers did not form syndicates to buy cattle, but they had other devices, which,
it was alleged, were well calculated to eliminate price-competition and reduce prices to
growers.
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been carried out, together, of course, with a prayer for relief. It is thus-in
essence-a very simple pleading.
The complaint in the Morgan case followed precedent. In Paragraph 43, the
charging paragraph, the defendants are alleged to be engaged "in a wrongful
... conspiracy to restrain ... the securities business ... by restricting, control-
ling, and fixing the channels and methods through which, and the prices, terms,
and conditions, upon which security issues are merchandized .. ". .,,1 The
alleged conspiracy in restraint of trade, thus, has to do with distribution, the
purchase and sale of securities. It is alleged to be wrongful in two respects: (1)
securities have been made to flow in controlled channels; (2) prices have been
fixed and maintained.
That is the conspiracy in restraint of trade-and the only such conspiracy-
charged in the complaint. In Paragraph 44A, some of the "means" are stated
by which the defendants are alleged to have agreed "not to compete among
themselves" in carrying out the conspiracy charged in Paragraph 43. The first
of these, alleged in Paragraph 44A (1), is the use by defendants of "the syn-
dicate method to merchandise ... security issues . . . ." The statistical data in
the case shows-without contradiction-that the seventeen defendant bankers,
by use of the syndicate method, managed over seventy percent of all issues of
$1,000,000 or more which were offered publicly on a negotiated basis during
the fifteen year period from 1935 to 1949. Stated quantitatively, the seventeen
defendant bankers managed security issues aggregating $17,337,087,000 out
of a total for the period of $23,673,017,000, a very substantial commerce, in-
deed.2 2 For reasons by no means clear the court made no mention of these
facts in his opinion.
In Paragraph 44B, the "means" are stated by which the defendants are
alleged to have agreed "to eliminate the competition of other investment
21, The full text, under the caption "Offenses Charged," is as follows: "43. Beginning
in or about the year 1915 and continuing thereafter up to and including the date of the filing
of this complaint, the defendants named herein, have engaged knowingly and continuously,
in a wrongful and unlawful conspiracy to restrain unreasonably and to monopolize the
securities business of the United States, by restricting, controlling, and fixing the channels
and methods through which, and the prices, terms, and conditions, upon which security
issues are merchandised, and have, in fact, unreasonably restrained the securities business
hereinbefore described, and have monopolized the merchandising of security issues thereln
by the negotiated underwritten method, all in restraint and in monopolization of the inter-
state commerce described in this complaint, in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act of
Congress of July 2, 1890, entitled 'An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful
restraints and monopolies,' as amended, commonly known as the Sherman Act (15 U.S.
C.A. §§ 1 and 2). Defendants threaten to continue such offenses and will continue them
unless the relief hereinafter prayed for in this complaint is granted."
Paragraph 43 was not changed, abandoned or modified in any way, throughout the case,
except only that on April 9, 1951, before any evidence was introduced, the words, "by the
negotiated underwritten method," were added in the interest of supposed greater clarity.
See United States v. Morgan, 11 F.R.D. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
22. Exhibit 11.(f), Transcript of Record, p. 7806, United States v. Morgan, 118 F.
Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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bankers" in carrying out the conspiracy.2 This part of the case w%-as largely
based on the fact that the defendant bankers, as managers of so large a part of
the new-issue business, have been able to grant participations in their syndi-
cates to other bankers, or to exclude them from underwritings, very much as
they saw fit. In fact, the syndicate is beautifully contrived as a safety valve to
prevent any unseemly competitive explosion. Bankers posing a small com-
petitive threat may be given a syndicate participation or their position in the
last underwriting may be improved; those who because of friendship with the
issuer or for some other reason might unseat the established manager may be
given a joint managership.
The evidence showed that, as a first step in the use of the syndicate method,
each of the defendants has long done business by getting himself named as
banker-whether traditional, regular or otherwise-for one or many issuers.
He then acts as a professional adviser, much as a lawyer or an accountant does,
in getting an issue ready for public offering. But there the comparison ends.
Unlike the lawyer or the accountant, the defendant banker customarily works
without fee. He plans to make his money out of the purchase and resale of the
securities themselves, when they are ready for market.
2 4
This was the core of the Government's case.2 5 In legal language, defendant
bankers were charged with using a service or professional relationship as a
means of doing a vast merchandising business in securities, with the purpose
and effect of controlling distribution channels and eliminating price-com-
petition.2 6 Moreover, the record leaves no real doubt that defendant bankers
do just that. They point with pride to the services they perform for their
23. This was a relatively minor term of the conspiracy in restraint of trade, and hence.
whether established by the evidence or not, was of little consequence. It was critical, of
course, to the counts of Paragraph 43 charging (1) a monopoly and (2) a conspiracy to
monopolize. After finding no conspiracy in restraint of trade, that is, no "integrated over-
all conspiracy," the court dismissed the monopoly charges without discussion. United States
v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
24. See, e.g., the deposition testimony of C. E. Mitchell of Blyth & Co., Transcript of
Record, p. 6958, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
25. One of the principal items of relief requested in the complaint was the separation
of the advisory functions of the banker from those of merchandising. See Prayer for Relief,
paras. 2, 4, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). This was pointed
out to the court many times. See e.g., Transcript of Record, p. 4794 ct seq., United States v.
Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
26. The "law" of the case was never much in doubt, although, in the nature of things,
there was no precedent ex.:actly on all fours. For the unlawfulness of using a service mo-
nopoly to control merchandising, the case of United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123
(E.D. Pa. 1943), was called to the court's attention; as to the effect of narrowing retail
outlets, Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); upon
controlling prices to the issuer, Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) ; United States v. Swift & Co., 52 F. Supp. 476 (D. Colo. 1943) ;
upon maintaining resale prices, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911). See generally, Berle, Banking Under the Antitrust Laws, 49 Co.. L Rv. 5S9
(1949).
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clients.2 7 They do not engage in price-competition, as will be discussed more
fully later on, either in the purchase or the sale of securities. On one memorable
occasion, in fact, learned counsel for one of the defendants went so far as to
suggest to the court that anyone would be a "stinker," 28 who would offer an
issuer a better price under such circumstances.
But, in Paragraphs 44A(2), (3) and (4), the Government went farther.
First, it was alleged that many such banker-client relationships are recognized
by defendant bankers as "traditional." If established, this would mean that the
defendants have even eliminated competition at the first step, that is, as to the
selection of a banker and in the formulation of financing plans. Secondly, it was
alleged that, by use of the "historical position" concept, many syndicates have
become more or less static from issue to issue, thus still further limiting the
issuer's market, and affecting the prices at which he might sell his securities.
Thirdly, by "reciprocity," defendants are alleged to have given participations
to each other on the basis of participations received or expected. In other
words, by use of a sort of financial patronage, defendants are alleged to have
built up a wide network of noncompetitive relationships in the industry. Most
of the evidence in the case bore on these "triple concept" allegations. But they
were merely the a fortiori parts of the case.
The fifth "means," Paragraph 44A(5), had to do with resale prices. There
is almost no fact dispute that in hundreds of syndicates, with anywhere from
one to fifteen or more of the defendants associated together as participants, it
has been agreed to maintain the public offering price for varying lengths of time,
at defendants' sole discretion. Likewise, dealers have been required to main-
tain resale prices; sales through others than syndicate or selling group mem-
bers have been prohibited, except when made at a fixed re-allowance; and,
issue after issue has been stabilized, all more or less as defendants have thought
best. Whether any one of these agreements would have been illegal in itself,
as seems likely, may be disregarded for the moment; they were offered primarily
as part of the proof showing that defendants had agreed to eliminate price-
competition among themselves in the conspiracy charged in Paragraph 43.20
27. See, e.g., the testimony of Walter E. Sachs, when testifying upon cross-examina-
tion as to the "service" his firm had performed for the May Company. Transcript of
Record, pp. 6850-5, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
28. Transcript of Record, p. 5262, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953). The Government's charge, that the defendants have agreed not to compete
price-wise in the purchase of securities from issuers, was described in this way: "That is
nothing more nor less than an agreement not to be 'stinkers.'"
29. Since defendants manage so large an amount of the new-issue business, and include
large numbers of non-defendants, as well as defendants, in their syndicates, this was, in
effect, a charge of no price-competition throughout the industry. Of course a new issue,
however brought out, must sell in competition with the general mass of outstanding securi-
ties, previously issued. That was not in question. The case was directed at four price re-
straints upon the flow of new securities into the general market: (1) the absence of com-
petition in negotiating prices to issuers; (2) maintenance of public offering prices by syn-
dicate members throughout distribution; (3) price restrictions upon resale by dealers; and
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No Unifying Element
The court's opinion is largely given over to an examination of the evidence
in the case. But at the outset reference is made to the memorandum of April 9,
1951, in which the court pointed out that, as he then saw the case, "the unif)ing
elements of the alleged conspiracy were obscure," to say the least.-" This
memorandum was written after months of discussion during the opening state-
ments of counsel, and only shortly before the Government started to introduce
its evidence. 31 Though "puzzled," the court was careful to say further that he
did not mean that "absent a 'unifying element' ... there can be no agreement
or conspiracy," but merely that in such case he should "proceed cautiously" in
viewing the evidence.
32
What the court meant by "unifying element," is fairly clear. The opinion
goes on to say by way of illustration: "no industry-wide uniformity was
charged;" there was "no powerful group such as the 'Big Three' operating
against independents," as in the American Tobacco c case; there was "no letter
or series of agreements presenting a definite plan to which others might con-
sciously adhere," as in the Interstate Circui 34 and Masonite3 cases; and,
"there appeared to be many non-defendant investment banking firms which
were larger, had more capital and did more business than some of the defen-
dants." 36 On the other hand, the court said several matters, which might have
served as "possible unifying element[s]," such as common membership in the
Investment Bankers Association, the keeping of reciprocity records, or the in-
vention of the syndicate system, had either been abandoned or disproved.
Of course, it is a commonplace that the presence or absence of conspiracy
must be determined by an examination of all the circumstances. It cannot be
determined by the application of some mechanical formula, nor is there any
authority that, in the absence of a so-called "unifying element," the court must
proceed with extra caution. The "unifying elements" in the cases cited by the
court (the agency contracts in Masonite, the letters in Interstatc Circuit) were
simply evidentiary circumstances present in those cases. In neither did that
factor in itself reflect or constitute the conspiracy. The same, it may be said,
is true with respect to the license agreements in the Gypsum case, 7 the fran-
(4) stabilization of the public offering price. See the Government's "Memorandum on
Price-Fi-xing," p. 2 et seq., submitted in March, 1951, Transcript of Record, United States
v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
30. United States v. Morgan, 11 F.R.D. 445 (1951).
3L The trial started on Nov. 28, 1950, but it was not until May 1, 1951, that the court
received any evidence. The intervening period to April 2, 1951 was given over to opening
statements, in very large part by defense counsel.
32. United States v. Morgan, 11 F.R.D. 445, 456 (1951).
33. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
34. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
35. United States v. fasonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
36. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). This last state-
ment is both ambiguous and irrelevant.
37. See note 10 supra.
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chise agreement in the Paramount 38 case, and the Communist Party in the
Dennis 39 case.
The Supreme Court has never reversed a finding of conspiracy, or approved
a refusal to find one, on the ground that a mechanical unifying element of the
kind sought by the court was either essential to a conspiracy or necessary to
prove one. The true test of conspiracy is the existence of a unity of purpose
to accomplish an unlawful object.40 Or, as more fully spelled out in the anti-
trust field, it is an association or understanding between erstwhile competitors
according to a common plan or design, "the necessary consequence of which,
if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce. 41 No mechanical or tangible
central fulcrum is needed. Likewise, as a matter of proof, it is sufficient if the
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, when viewed in its entirety, rather than
piecemeal, establishes the existence of such a unity of purpose or common de-
sign.
What exact effect the absence of a so-called "unifying element" may have
had in bringing the court to dismiss the case, is of course difficult to say. The
unsuccessful search for a mechanical element tying the defendants together
appears, however, wholly to have obscured for the court the actual charge of
conspiracy as alleged in the complaint, that is, that the defendant bankers are
associated or tied together in a common plan and purpose to eliminate price-
competition in the purchase and sale of securities and to channelize distribution.
The opinion is written-and presumably the case was decided-as though these
matters had very little to do with the case.
Integrated Over-all Conspiracy
Judge Medina does not make an analysis of the several counts alleged in
Paragraph 43 of the complaint. 42 Rather, he paints a broad impressionistic
picture of the case. Thus, under the heading: "The Offense as Charged in the
Complaint," the two counts charging first a conspiracy to restrain trade and
38. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
39. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
40. The remarks of Mr. Justice Holmes in United States v. Kissel and Harned, 218
U.S. 601, 608 (1910) are interesting: "A conspiracy is constituted by an agreement, it is
true, but it is the result of the agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just lis a part-
nership, although constituted by a contract, is not the contract but is a result of it." See
also Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921) ; Direct Sales Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
41. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939).
42. These were carefully described as being four in number: (1) a count based on con-
spiracy to restrain trade; (2) a count on actual restraint; (3) a count on conspiracy to
monopolize; and, (4) a count charging an actual monopolization. See Transcript of Record,
p. 4469, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). That the first two
counts constitute separate offenses, under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and the last two,
separate offenses under Section 2, is well settled. See, e.g., discussion in Montrose Lumber
Co. v. United States, 124 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1941) ; United States v. A. B. Dick Co., 7
F.R.D. 437 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
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secondly a conspiracy to monopolize are simply run together and described as
constituting one single offense. As the court put it: "The complaint charges
an integrated over-all conspiracy.., by which the defendants as a group 'de-
veloped a system' to eliminate competition and monopolize 'the cream of the
business' of investment banking.
'43
Of course, there is no "conspiracy" k-nown to the law-integrated, over-all
or otherwise-which comprises both "monopoly" and "restraint of trade." But,
as appears a few pages later, such was the offense charged, as the court saw it:
"Thus it is the 17 defendant banking houses, arrayed against the balance of the
investment banking industry, and alleged to be acting in combination to mo-
nopolize 'the cream of the business,' and divide it up among themselves, by ex-
cluding those investment banking houses which are not part of the conspiracy."
44
Contrary to the court's statement, this "cream of the business" language does
not appear in the complaint. The improvisation was perhaps harmless enough
as applied to the monopoly aspects of the case. There, indeed, the seventeen
defendants are alleged to be arrayed against the industry. But, as applied to
the conspiracy to restrain trade, it gave a seriously distorted view. The main
thrust of that conspiracy, as pointed out above, was stated in Paragraph 44A :
it consisted first and foremost of an alleged agreement among the defendant
bankers "not to compete among themselves." Whether the defendants by so
doing would be able to get or hold the "cream of the business" from the rest of
the industry was wholly beside the point.
How the court came to fall into such an error is not clear; probably it occurred
at some time during the opening statements, when defense counsel were per-
mitted to talk at great length on many subjects. By the time the memorandum
of April 9, 1951 was written, the idea evidently had become firmly fixed in the
court's mind: "Despite the references to testimony and documents to be pro-
duced and the prolonged discussion pro and con, I am still in the dark as to
what will constitute the unifying element or other nexus which is to place these
defendants, perhaps with a few investment banking firms more or less, in a
conspiracy or combination to restrain or e.rclude the conpetition of the rest of
the investment bankers and to monopolize the business or any part thereof to
the detriment of such other investment bankers."
45
Such a construction of Paragraph 43, of course, is not only unique; it is
manifest error.46 It would make no difference in the court's view to what ex-
43. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
44. Id. at 632.
45. United States v. Morgan, 11 F.R.D. 445, 454 (1951) (italics added).
46. The Government in its "Memorandum on the Over-Al Conspiracy" submitted on
May 29, 1951, Transcript of Record, p. 7942, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), carefully described "the conspiracy in restraint of trade" for the court, as
"one" only of the "four counts" stated in Paragraph 43 of the complaint. The use of
"over-all" was to emphasize the point that the complaint was not directed at any particular
syndicate operation. The idea of an "integrated" conspiracy, part monopoly and part re-
straint of trade, originated with the court, quite possibly aided by defense counsel.
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tent the defendant firms might be shown unlawfully to have conspired to restrain
competition as between themselves. The case would be dismissed unless it could
also be shown that the conspiracy had the monopoly effect of eliminating the
competition of other investment bankers, so that the seventeen could have "the
cream of the business" themselves. The court, therefore, seems to have added
something quite new to the Sherman Act-without congressional sanction-
an "integrated over-all conspiracy," made up, presumably in equal parts, of re-
straint of trade, under Section 1, and of monopoly, under Section 2.
Invention of the Syndicate System
The charge being thus defined, the court turned to the evidence. Who in-
vented "The Syndicate System" next became a question of great moment.
Early in the trial, as above noted, Judge Medina had regarded that as a possible
"unifying element," for, as he says: "it was claimed that defendants and their
'predecessors' had invented the syndicate system to further their plan and
scheme."'47 And, to a point, the court was right, for it is alleged in Paragraph
27 of the complaint, as part of the description of the industry, that "the modern
syndicate method of distributing securities was invented by defendant banking
firms and their predecessors in 1915 and . . .modified by them from time to
time in details."
But, invention of "the syndicate system," was never alleged to be a "unifying
element." It was the itse of the syndicate method-regardless of who invented
it-which was put in issue. That was alleged in Paragraph 44A (1) to be one
of the several "means" employed by the defendants in carrying out the restraint
of trade conspiracy charged in Paragraph 43. Yet there is no indication, through-
out a long opinion, that the court ever examined the syndicate method evidence
for its bearing on the charge that the defendants had agreed to eliminate price-
competition and to channelize distribution. On the contrary, having become
persuaded that the defendants were not the sole inventors of the system, and
so, that the system could not serve as a "unifying element," he simply put it
to one side.
Certain excerpts from the opinion are illuminating. On the basis of about
1,300 "syndicate agreements" in evidence, the court stated that "they contain
a great variety of provisions relative to price maintenance, the trading account
or stabilization, withholding commissions (the so-called 'penalty' clauses), uni-
form concessions and reallowances, authorizations to the manager to act for
the group in such matters as group sales, dealer sales, syndicate and price
termination, extension or price reduction, and so on."'"8 Or, as he put the
thing shortly: "There is a conspicuous lack of uniformity. '49 Of course, the
court said, there is "a certain fundamental similarity in those features which
are characteristic of the system." 50 How could it be otherwise, in view of "the
47. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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evolution of the syndicate system over the years" ?' And, while defendant bank-
ing firms, "motivated solely by normal, ordinary business considerations," as
the court put it, were said to have "played their several parts" in the "evolution
of the syndicate system," they were not alone, for "other prominent and lead-
ing investment banking houses" also played an unspecified part in the creation. r2
Hence, the court concluded: "There was, with reference to the development and
use of the syndicate system, no concert of action, no agreement and no con-
spiracy, integrated, over-all or otherwise."r5 3
Such a sweeping finding would be impressive if it stood alone. The court,
however, made plain the two standards by which he evaluated the evidence
upon which it rests: (1) was there such "uniformity" in the forms as to show
connivance; and, (2) did the defendants alone invent "the syndicate system"?
The first test was erroneous, since it was not charged-as a nexus of the con-
spiracy-that the defendants ever agreed or conspired to write "uniform" syn-
dicate agreements. Secondly, as pointed out above, it is wholly immaterial that
some other banker or bankers may also have had a part in developing the sys-
tem. Hence, the court's finding, tested by the standards used by the court,
would seem to be entitled to no weight whatever as a matter of law.
In fact, the court's brief summary of the content of some of the "syndicate
agreements" before him is a clear affirmative finding that they actually do con-
tain all sorts of restrictive price and penalty clauses. Had the court under-
stood the offense charged in the complaint, that is, that defendants have agreed
to eliminate price-competition between themselves in the purchase and sale of
securities and to channelize distribution, he would have seen how immaterial
it is that each form was not identical with every other, or that defendant bankers
were not the sole inventors of the system they use. It may, in fact, have been
more effective to tailor each agreement differently, as to minor matters, to serve
the alleged common purpose of eliminating price-competition.
Also, it is of more than footnote significance that the court failed here, as
elsewhere, to notice that in almost every syndicate operation which he con-
sidered, from one to fifteen or more of the defendants, in addition to the man-
ager, were parties to the syndicate agreenlents as participants. This was the
strongest kind of evidence of association according to a common plan or "sys-
tem." It was quite misleading, therefore, to suggest, as the court does, that
each of the defendant firms acted entirely alone, "as separate entities,"54 in
the drafting and use of these agreements.
No "Captive" Issuer
With defendants' use of the syndicate method thus disposed of so handily,
it might be expected that the court would next have examined the "triple con-
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Id. at 684.
54. Id. at 683.
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cept" evidence. The first was a "means" alleged in Paragraph 44A (1) of the
complaint, the latter were "means" alleged in Paragraphs 44A (2), (3), and
(4). But Judge Medina said that it would "put the whole case out of focus"
to do this, since in the absence of a showing of "substantial domination and con-
trol of issuers, as alleged, the 'triple concept' charge may come down to mere
dialectics." 55 Why this should be so, the court does not say, but it may have
become apparent to him that if he went ahead to examine this evidence in
isolation, as he had the syndicate method evidence, without regard to the price
and channelizing charges of Paragraph 43, it would be a quite meaningless
thing to do.
At any rate, Part IV of the opinion is next given over to a consideration of
whether the defendant bankers had combined for the purpose, as stated in the
heading, of "Dominating and Controlling... the Financial Affairs of Issuers."
This statement of the question immediately gives way in the text to "domination
and control of issuers by the 17 defendant firms acting in concert."50 Moreover,
it is fairly clear that the court felt it was incumbent on the Government to prove
just that: "For, if issuers were free agents, they could always turn to any one
or more of the dozens of other competent and well-equipped investment bankers,
said to be eager to get the business but unable to do so bcause of the operation
of the combination and conspiracy of the seventeen." 7
Quite evidently the court was again in search of a "unifying element." And,
of course, if it could be shown that the seventeen actually did have the many
issuers for whom they acted in their pockets, so to speak, then surely he would
have something. But, while the complaint alleges, in Paragraph 25, that "[d] e-
fendant banking firms frequently play an important part in the management of
issuing companies ... and sometimes control the business affairs of an issuer,"
this was alleged merely as part of the description of the industry. It was not
alleged as a "term" of the conspiracy, much less as a so-called "unifying ele-
ment."
Nevertheless, the court now seized on this minor introductory allegation and
inflated it into a main charge in the case. As he says, under the heading "Some
Further Interim Observations": "the allegation of domination and control of
issuers presents one of the fundamental and crucial controverted issues of fact
in the case." 58 This idea, of "domination and control of issuers," seems to have
obsessed the court. Apparently he regarded it as his function to show that the
talk of monopoly and domination before the TNEC was without substance. At
all events he sums up his consideration of the matter with the round statement
that: "This record has not revealed a single issuer which can fairly be said to
55. Id. at 701 (italics added).
56. Ibid. (italics added).
57. Id. at 700. The court's point, if true, which is more than doubtful, would be relevant
to the monopoly issue. It would have no bearing on the restraint of trade charge, that is,
that defendants have agreed to eliminate price-competition between themselves and to
channelize distribution.
58. Id. at 730.
(Vol. 64:169
THE INVESTMENT BANKERS' CASE
be the 'captive' of any or all or any combination of these seventeen defendant
firms." 9 Thus, having set up a straw man, the court knocks him down with
gusto. The central issue in the case was not "domination and control of issuers,"
but, as charged in Paragraph 43, whether the defendants were engaged in a
way of doing business which had the purpose and effect of eliminating price-
competition in the purchase and sale of securities and of channelizing distribu-
tion. This was pointed out to the court over and over again, wvith no apparent
recognition on his part.
The evidence before the court had largely to do with directorships and was
offered by the Government under Paragraph 44E(1) of the complaint. It is
there alleged that one of the "means" employed by defendants "to influence
and control the management and financial activities of issuers"--and hence to
carry out the conspiracy charged in Paragraph 43-was this: "securing the
appointment or election of directors ... of issuers who, in addition to the per-
formance of their duties, as such, would promote the interests of securing
further underwriting business for the defendant banking firms."
Moreover, the evidence clearly established, what everyone knows to be true,
that in many cases officers or partners of defendants have gone on the board
of directors of issuers, thus giving their firms-and the syndicates they put
together-a strong noncompetitive position in the subsequent purchase of the
issuer's securities. But the court said: "No attempt was made to show the
circumstances under which any of these men became directors," c0 as if that
were material. And, he went on to say that "in many cases the men in ques-
tion were invited by the management to come on the board," and many were
men "of proven competence and judgment"--both matters not in controversy."'
Finally, since some of the defendants had many directorships and others few
or none at all, he said that there was a complete "lack of any conspiratorial
pattern." 6
2
Of course, no "conspiratorial pattern" was ever charged at this level. What
the Government's statistical evidence did show was that, in the aggregate, where
such interlocking relationships have existed, the directors' firms have managed
or co-managed eighty-six percent of subsequent business. This was plainly
strong evidence of a lack of any competition in the purchase of securities from
such issuers, something defendants were charged with conspiring to bring
about.63 The court, though, disregarded the point, and went on, at some pains,
59. Id. at 655. The court further says: "The myth of domination and control of issuers
... which was fostered by the ex parte TNEC proceedings ... should, perhaps, be given a
decefit burial and quietly laid to rest" Id. at 731. But surely the court is lacking in due
respect, to say the least, in trying to bury so hardy a citizen-and with such haste--when
he did nothing more serious than barely to get within the periphery of the case. The Gov-
ernment never undertook to show that any issuer was ever "captive" of any banker.
60. Id. at 708.
61. Id. at 709.
62. Id. at 710.
63. The court, mirabile dictt, turned this evidence upside down, at the prompting of
defense counsel, and said these interlocking director relationships were really a device used
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to make up his own statistical tabulation. It showed the interesting, but irrele-
vant, fact that such business (where an interlocking relationship existed) ac-




Judge Medina deals at length with the evidence in support of Paragraph
44A(2), the "traditional banker" evidence. Part V of his opinion, under the
heading, "The 'Triple Concept,'" is given over to it. But, to know what legal
spectacles he used to view this evidence it is necessary to go back to that part
of the opinion entitled, "Some Interim Observations." There, in speaking of
defendants' use of the syndicate method, the court said: "If, on the important
and fundamental phase of the case which has just been examined, there was
no joint action nor any combination by the seventeen acting as a group, lack
of such concerted action among them may likewise appear in other phases of
the case as well."6' 5 After some further discussion of what to the Court was the
"'triple concept' charge,"66 he decided first to dispose of the "dominance"
allegations, as above discussed.
It is apparent, therefore, that when the court reached the traditional or regular
banker evidence he had made the same error of law as in the other parts of
the opinion already discussed. The complaint, Paragraph 44A(2), does not
charge that the defendants by "joint action" conspired in advance to recognize
and defer to certain of their number as the "traditional" bankers for certain
issuers. On the contrary, it merely alleges that the defendants do recognize
and defer to the "claims" of traditional bankers, as only one of several "means"
by which defendants are charged with having conspired to eliminate price-
competition and to channelize distribution. But the court seems never to have
been able to get hold of the basic charge of the alleged conspiracy, and so he
pursued each alleged "means" to exhaustion, as if it were charged as the nexus
of the conspiracy.
In this instance the court was able to reach over to Paragraph 45, dealing
with "restrictive customs and practices," to lend credence to his point that the
"triple concept" allegations, not Paragraph 43, must constitute the nexus of
the conspiracy. Defendants are there alleged, by "concert of action," to "operate
pursuant" to certain restrictive practices, including recognition of "traditional
banker" and so on. Of course, to anyone familiar with pleading, that is a funny
by defendants "to further competition for investment banking business." Id. at 703. So, it
seems, they gave no offense to the Sherman Act. Of course, long-term contracts givine the
banker express, rather than tacit, control of future financing-as were once used in the
industry-would have been an even more effective competitive "device," of the same sort.
That is, they would not have been a competitive device at all, but a means of preventing
competition for the purchase of securities and, as such, plainly unlawful. Standard Oil
Company of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1.949).
64. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
65. Id. at 699 (italics added).
66. Ibid. (italics added).
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place to go for a statement of the offenses charged. The only "concert of action"
having any bite in it is that charged in Paragraph 43. In other words, if de-
fendants have in fact conspired to eliminate price-competition and to channelize
distribution, it would make no difference whether they had concertedly em-
ployed each or any one of the "restrictive practices" or "means" alleged to
have been employed.
Looking at the mass of traditional banker evidence as he did, however, the
court was able to make this carefully worded finding: "I find that Morgan
Stanley at no time 'adhered' to any 'practice' of 'traditional banker,' nor was
Morgan Stanley at any time a party to any conspiracy or agreement on 'suc-
cessorships,' nor to any 'code' having such or any similar provisions."G- The
same, in substance, is next found with respect to each of the other sixteen
defendants.
It is evident, on the face of it, that this finding does not meet the Govern-
ment's case. It is not a finding that Morgan Stanley & Co. has never and does
not now at times recognize and defer "to the claims of traditional bankers to
manage and control the merchandising of the securities of particular issuers,"
as alleged in Paragraph 44A(2). The court, in fact, could not properly have
made such a finding on the evidence before him. For one thing, it would
squarely contradict Stanley's own express declaration that: "If the business
is satisfactorily done, it would be fair enough to think that the fellow who has
it should keep on with it. ' 68 Stanley's statenent with much supporting evidence
was offered-and urged throughout-as the plainest sort of proof that Morgan
Stanley & Co. does defer to the claims of traditional or regular bankers, pro-
vided, of course, the relationship is a satisfactory oneO The evidence gave
the court much trouble, as well it might: he finally disposed of it incorrectly,
but with a great show of virtue, by saying the Government had "virtually
abandoned the theory of the complaint," and was now, with many "twists and
turns," urging such evidence as some sort of "lesser charge," which he cer-
tainly would not permit them to do.70
In the case of Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the opinion also shows dearly that a find-
ing of the sort required could not have been made. John Schiff, a partner and
67. Id. at 754.
68. Id. at 746. It would also contradict Stanley's basic view of the business, that it can
best be done by private negotiation.
69. See Plaintiff's Rebuttal Brief of June 19, 1953, p. 9 et .seq., United States v. Morgan,
118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
70. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The court's
further statement, that Government counsel had "insinuated" from the start that the de-
fendants use "satisfactory relationship," "inheritance," and so on, as "double talk," designed
to "cover up" and "conceal their operations" like "bootleggers might use a sort of canting
speech," id. at 734-5, would be very unfair to counsel, if it were not so fantastically wrong.
These words were used by the defendants, and, so far as the record shows, they mean just
what any normal person would understand them to mean. It vas the court, not Govern-
ment counse, who was always concerned about "connivance," "double talk," "skullduggery"
and such things. Id. at 757.
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a defendant in the case, testified upon deposition, subject to full cross-examina-
tion, that it was the policy of his firm not to go after business where the issuer
had an established banking relationship. While the court brushed this testimony
aside with the remark that it "must be read with some reservation," 71 it is
surely evident that the court could not have found in the face of it, and the
supporting evidence, 72 that Kuhn, Loeb & Co. has not deferred to the claims
of traditional bankers, with the purpose and effect of eliminating price-com-
petition. At all events, no such finding was made, either with respect to Kuhn,
Loeb & Co. or any of the other defendants.
The latter part of the finding, that no one of the defendants is "a party to
any conspiracy or agreement on 'successorships,'" is likewise-for the reasons
above stated---completely off center. No "conspiracy" on successorships was
ever charged. But the bare fact that anyone should even make a claim to "suc-
cessorship" in a truly competitive industry is surely unusual. This occurred
at the time when the Glass-Steagal Act 78 was passed and several of the bank
security-affiliates, such as the Guaranty Company, went out of business. In
the case of Guaranty, Swan and others went over to E. B. Smith & Co. (now
the defendant Smith, Barney & Co.) and claimed-because of past relation-
ship--that the business formerly done by the Guaranty Company was theirs.
In many cases-though not all-these and other similar claims to "inheritance"
were recognized, thus bearing out dramatically the traditional banker allega-
tions of Paragraph 44A(2).
It will be noted, in all this, that the first question, that is, whether continuing
banker-client relationships do exist in the industry, is not in real dispute. The
interlocking directorship cases, disposed of separately by the court, are a prime
traditional-banker example, but the Government also put many others in evi-
dence, where the relationship was only slightly less close. In some, as in the
case of the Pacific Gas & Electric Company account, there was an early contest
for leadership. The court with great zeal brought these instances to the fore-
in order that "light and air" 74 might be permitted to enter-but saw no signifi-
cance to the Government's point that in issue after issue thereafter the leader-
ship remained unchanged, with no evidence of any further competition of the
sort, much less of price-competition for the securities when ready for market.
71. Id. at 757.
72. Exhibit 117, Transcript of Record, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Stipp. 621,
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), is a case in point. This was a memorandum, dictated by Schiff in
regard to Armstrong Cork financing, in which he said: "I explained to Mr. Freeman
that the Guaranty Company's successor was E. B. Smith & Co., and that naturally
we did not want to poach on their preserves." (Italics added.) The court turned this upside
down also. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 760-1 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The
evidence did not mean what it said, and what Schiff testified it meant. To the court, it was
a very subtle illustration of how the Kuhn, Loeb "show window" method of "competition"
worked. In plain words, of course, show window competition means that the firm does not
engage in price-competition at all, even as charged.
73. 48 STAT. 162 (1933), 12 U.S.C. c. 2, 3, 6 (1952).
74. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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Historical Position and Reciprocity
With "traditional banker" out of the way, the court made short work of
"historical position" and "reciprocity." It is difficult, in fact, to say what the
actual finding of the court is as respects the first, except that it appears from
a short discussion under the heading, "Historical Position," that he regarded
the allegations of the complaint to have been disproved.70 In the case of recipro-
city, the discussion is even briefer, but the basis for the court's finding is made
quite explicit: "Were there some uniformity or some common pattern the case
would be different. As it is, there is a pattern of no pattern; and I find that,
considering all the evidence in the record, including the stipulated statistical
data, the reciprocity clrge has been disproved."
7 0
Here again Judge Medina could not properly have made a finding to con-
trovert the Government's case, that is, he could not have found that the de-
fendants have not reciprocally exchanged participations in the buying groups
which they manage, as alleged in Paragraph 44A (4). For the evidence showed,
as the court noted, that some of the defendants have kept reciprocity records. 7
And, at least two witnesses testified on deposition, subject to cross-examina-
tion, that their firms do award participations-where there is a place open-
on the basis, in part, of business received from other bankers, or expected in
the future.78 The statistical data also showed that a very large part of the
participation business done by the defendants was received from each other.
All of this was simply disregarded to make the interesting, but immaterial,
finding that "there is a pattern of no pattern." Pattern in a price-conspiracy
case, or in any other for that matter, is not essential, or even to be expected,
at a "means" level.
Probably the "historical position" evidence was found wanting upon much
the same basis. It, too, failed of a perfect pattern, though there was a remark-
able amount of substantial similarity. The court, however, went on to point
out that "'claims' based on 'historical position' are made throughout the in-
dustry as a whole, and not by any single group, such as the seventeen invest-
ment banking houses made defendants in this case." 70 But this reason was no
better than the first, since, as above discussed, the circumstance that other in-
dustry members may likewise assert "historical position" is entirely consistent
with the Government's restraint of trade case.80 Indeed, it greatly strengthens
it.
75. Id. at 7,38.
76. Id. at 633 (italics added).
77. Ibid.
78. These were C.E. Mitchell of Blyth & Co., Inc., and Monroe Gutman of Lehman
Brothers, both of whom testified with commendable frantmess. Transcript of Record, pp.
10,976, 10,897, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
79. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
80. The fact that a practice is industry-wide has been held many times not to negative
a charge that particular members of the industry are engaged in a conspiracy in restraint
of trade. Among the cases cited to the court were: Butterick Co. v. Federal Trade Comn'n,
4 F.2d 910, 911-2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 602 (1925) ; Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.
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Affirmatively, what the court has done in this part of his opinion is to find
that defendant bankers do make claims to "historical position" and that, as
managers, they do recognize such claims on the part of others in numberless
cases. Also, that defendants, whether as a "polite refusal" or otherwise, have
denied participations--or denied an increased participation-to many bankers
who do not have historical position.8 1 Moreover, this was clone by the defen-
dants, not the issuers, for as the court further states: "While it is difficult to
generalize on the subject, however, it seems to me that the issuers more or less
left it to the manager to make up the group, as the manager would be in a
better position to know who should be included."8 2 In other words, the court
found affirmatively exactly what the Government alleged in Paragraph 44A (3)
of the complaint.
This part of the opinion, properly understood, is even more favorable to the
Government. For Judge Medina goes on to say that while the documents "are
full of such words as 'claims' and 'rights,' "83 nevertheless: "The competition
for participations in the various underwritings, and to some extent even for
positions in the selling groups, is intense .... -84 It seems, moreover, that:
"There is a good deal of dissatisfaction with the participations which are finally
allotted and practically every investment banker seems always to be using vari-
ous arguments to get a better position than before, or at least a position which
is no worse than before."
85
It must surely have been evident to the court that a mere scramble for
positions in a syndicate is not price-competition. If anything, it is competition
not to have price-competition. Were there real price-competition those bankers
dissatisfied with their position in the historical group, or some of them, would
join with others, and themselves offer to buy the issuer's securities,' as is done
almost every day in the case of competitive bidding. So, far from having dis-
proved the Government's case, therefore, the court actually found in its favor,
not only that "historical position" is used as alleged, but that "practically
every investment banker" prefers to cling to an unsatisfactory "position" rather
than offer price-competition.87
v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 118 (1948) ; and, of course, United States v. Dennis, 183
F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
81. United States v. Morgan. 118 F. Supp. 621, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
82. Id. at 739-40.
83. Id. at 738.
84. Ibid. (italics added).
85. Ibid.
86. Even at the risk of being called "stinkers."
87. This finding actually cuts the ground from under the defendants' use of the syn-
dicate. Erstwhile competitors may properly combine to buy an issue, where that is neces-
sary because of insufficient capital,-or perhaps for other reasons, but where each participant
could have taken a much larger share of the issue than he got, it is pretty plain that they
have gone beyond the line. The syndicate ihe); becomes a simple combination in restraint
of trade. Nor is there any doubt as to the correctness of the court's finding, for it is also
supported by the "historical position" evidence. In many cases a group which may have
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Some Interim Observations
It is time to take stock. The court has now, in just short of 200 pages, dis-
posed of most of the Government's case, without finding anything whatever
to support it. Of what remains, only the competitive bidding eidence-which
the court seems also to have put off to one side in his thinking-will require
comment. It is in order, therefore, to look briefly at how the court disposed
of the case. It is apparent, at once, whether one is familiar with antitrust law
or not, that the court never looked at the case as a whole; indeed, he could not
very well have done so, for he was always off on a quest for some sort of
"unifying element," in disregard of the charges stated in Paragraph 43.
Counsel, on both sides, told the court many times that he could not properly
dispose of a conspiracy case piece-meal. It would not do to look separately at
"traditional banker" and each of the various "means" alleged in the complaint,
and then to throw them out one at a time. But, with disarming frankness, judge
Medina made it clear in his opinion that he did not agree: "There is much to
be said in support of this reasoning; but the converse of it is equally sound.
As each of these several props to the Government charge is disproven and thus
eliminated, the structure as a whole finds less and less support."88 That may
truly be an effective way to pull down a structure, but it is not an accepted
way to try a conspiracy case. In fact, it was gross error.8
The court's error carried over even into the day by day receipt of evidence.
Again, it was carefully explained to him, ad vauscam, that evidence in a cir-
cumstantial case of conspiracy can best be regarded as forming a "mosaic";
that in the nature of the case the picture does not become clear until all the
evidence is in. But Judge Medina would not be put off in that way; he felt
he must make a microscopic examination of each item as it was introduced. As
he said:
"Don't forget that the pieces of the mosaic are constantly forming.
The talk about putting the mosaic together at the end of the case
means putting true, accurate factual pieces together after the contro-
versy on the facts has been resolved as to each piece. So you must
not think that I am going to wait until perhaps a year from now to
decide out of a huge welter of proof what are the pieces to be put
together, and it seems to me that is one of the thiings that the prosecu-
tion here has not paid due attention to. They have assumed that they
are right on every one of these pieces, but if as to a substantial number
had to strain its resources to do a large issue is held together later even for quite small
issues.
88. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 699-700 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (italics
added).
89. Among the many cases on the point are: American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) ; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 544 (1913) ; Swift & Co.
v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). Mr. Justice Van Devanter, in the Pallen case,
made the point this way: "It hardly needs statement that the character and effect of a
conspiracy is not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts, but only
by looking at it as a whole."
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I find the little piece to be black instead of white, how is it going to
fit in ?"9
Later in the case Judge Medina gave another illustration of what he was
doing. He was piling up the evidence like "stones," he said, some of which
might go "in the mosaic," and some not. Of course they had to be "real"
stones, that was a point he was going "to be scrupulous on." Then, continu-
ing, "I have a little pile on one side and a little pile on the other side of my
mind, one that represents piles of real stones and the other represents a pile
of stones that have collapsed and are to be more or less disregarded, then I
have got the ones that I figure are real stones, and we will see what they
make." 9'
As we have seen, they made nothing at all. If one may judge from the
opinion, the pile of stones in the court's mind which might fit into a conspiracy
mosaic was practically non-existent. Not even one little stone seems to have
survived the process. But, surely, it is evident that the attempt to pass upon
each item of evidence for accuracy, as it came in, and then, at that time, to take
the next step also, and to pile it on one side or the other conspiracy-wise, was
flagrant error. A court may no more properly make a piece-meal disposition
of evidence, item by item, than he may knock out the various ncans alleged in
the complaint, prop by prop.
Competitive Bidding
Judge Medina showed very little interest in the Government's evidence on
competitive bidding when he reached it. Having, to his satisfaction, knocked
the "props" out from under the "integrated over-all conspiracy," there ap-
parently was not much left to do. At any rate, Part VI of the opinion is brief,
a mere six or seven pages, and quite discursive. But the court does say that
the defendants were not shown to have been engaged in a conspiracy to oppose
competitive bidding: "we shall find that here again there was no joint action
whatever by any conspiratorial combination. '9 2 Since no conspiracy was ever
charged at that point, even this statement might as well have gone unsaid.
The Government's evidence, as a matter of fact, was quite interesting, for it
dealt with the long fight which the defendants have put up against "shopping
around,"9 3 as well as "competitive bidding." That is to say, it got directly at
90. Transcript of Record, pp. 8318-9, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953). For a discussion of the art of making mosaics during the middle ages, if that
has any point, see ROBB & GARRIsoN, ART IN THE WESTERN WORLD, 113 et seq. (1942).
91. Transcript of Record, p. 18,325, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953). For other illustrations see id. at 10,286 and 12,439.
92. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
93. "Shopping around" is an informal way by which an issuer may get competing
price offers. The evidence showed that the defendants were even more opposed to It, than
to public sealed bidding. But the court saw no significance in that: "My own conclusion
is that the machinery of 'shopping around,' which favored the less scrupulous bargainer,
had little to commend it." Id. at 821. Of course it is not uncommon for an issuer, when
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the question whether, as charged in Paragraph 43 of the complaint, the de-
fendants actually have developed their way of doing business with the purpose
and effect of eliminating price-competition and channelizing distribution. More-
over, contrary to the impression given by the court, each of the defendants,
singly and in combination, was shown to have had a part in the conflict.04 Thus,
far from being a matter to be dismissed easily, with the oft-repeated comment
that the contentions of Government counsel "stem from a misconception of the
investment banking business,"' s the evidence dealt with the heart of the case.
The highlight was the "campaign" of Eaton and Stuart, investment bankers,
together with Robert R. Young, railroad issuer, to bring about competitive
bidding. The team was a good one. Faced with a history of twenty-five years
or more in which only two firms, that is, either ITuhn, Loeb & Co. or J. P.
Morgan & Co. (and later Morgan Stanley & Co.), had managed substantially
all railroad financing, there was not much chance for a competing banker to
have any part in this business. But Young made it clear in connection with
the $30,000,000 of financing for the C. & 0. in 1938, that his railroad, at least,
wanted price-competition. 6 And, in that case, the business finally went to the
Stuart-Eaton syndicate, at a saving of thousands of dollars over the price
quoted by Stanley and Walker on behalf of the traditional bankers.0 1
But the court was not impressed. In fact, to him, the whole thing was "an
unsavory subject," about which "the less said.., the better."08 He did, how-
ever, discuss one "unsavory" episode, that dealing with the financing for the
Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis in 1939.0 There the regular
bankers, Morgan Stanley & Co. and Iuhn, Loeb & Co., had worked out private-
ly the terms of a proposed bond issue, all without fee, in expectation of later
buying the issue and distributing it at a profit. It was at this point, that Young,
on behalf of one of the constituent carriers, demanded price-competition, even
as contemplated by Congress when it passed the Sherman Act. And, after a
considerable campaign,100 he succeeded, the regular bankers withdrew, and the
issue went to competitive bidding.
negotiating with a syndicate, to get "price views" from commercial bankers and others
familiar with market conditions, but that is not spoken of as "shopping around," nor is it
"price competition."
94. For one thing, each of the defendants was a party to one or more briefs in opposi-
tion to competitive bidding.
95. Id. at 817.
96. The whole story, under the title, A Strange Alliance for Monopoly, is told by
Young in the Atlantic Mlonthly for December, 1946. The substance of his account was put
in evidence, but, while the court said it "deserves description," he chose to "pass it by."
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
97. There was a question of fact whether an actual "bid" was made for the securities,
or whether Stanley and Walker merely quoted a price. Ibid. For present purposes it makes
little difference; there is no gain-saying the point that a price wvas quoted.
98. Ibid.
99. Id. at 819.
100. The court speaks of this as "a campaign of misrepresentation," of "misstatements
of fact," and even of "vituperation," id. at 818-19, but points to no cvidence in the record,
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This episode, too, did not impress the court. At least not favorably. Perhaps
he simply missed the point, for he said: "While there is doubtless much to be
said on each side... it is clear to me that it is no part of my function to pass on
the merits of the controversy over public sealed bidding; and I shall not do
so.''1°1 Of course, the court was never asked to pass on the merits of com-
petitive bidding; but he was asked over and over again to view defendants'
opposition thereto for its bearing on the central charge of the complaint, that is,
that defendants had conspired to eliminate price-competition and to channelize
distribution. The opinion gives no sign that the court ever so examined the
competitive bidding evidence.
The plain fact is that the defendants' continuing-banker way of doing busi-
ness could not well exist in the face of price-competition. The competitive
bidding evidence shows this rather plainly. In numberless cases the traditional
group-for all its supposed familiarity with the issuer's affairs-has been un-
able or unwilling to pay as much for the issuer's securities as a competing
syndicate.' 0 2 Moreover, the management fee has had to be reduced from, say,
one-quarter point to a mere five percent of the spread, or has been dropped
altogether, and spreads in turn have been greatly narrowed. 03 It would seem,
therefore, that instead of being an "unsavory" subject, to be summarily dis-
missed, the competitive bidding evidence should have been very persuasive, in-
deed.
Plan or Business Necessity
It was common ground between court and counsel that "the Sherman Act
was not designed to compel businessmen in any industry to compete in any
particular way."' 0 4 The Act is directed at restraints. But it was easy for the
defendants to say next-as they did quite often-that competitive methods
are necessarily different in the securities business on Wall Street than, say, in
the clothing business on Grand Street.10 Thus a trap was laid. If it should
appear that there was some competition-however polite-in the securities
nor is there any, to support such intemperate charges. The campaign no doubt was dis-
tasteful to the defendant bankers, but the evidence indicates that so also is price-competition
of any sort. Young's announced purpose was to reduce costs, still a quite respectable ob-
jective.
101. Id. at 819.
102. The most dramatic illustration, perhaps, is the A.T. & T. financing. Prior to 1941,
when the company went to competitive bidding, J. P. Morgan & Co. (and later Morgan
Stanley & Co.), as the company's bankers, had managed issues aggregating in the neighbor-
hood of $2,000,000,000. Since then, not only have financing costs been greatly reduced-
from a spread of two points or more to less than one-half at times-but the Morgan Stanley
& Co. syndicate has been outbid on many occasions.
103. This appeared in the statistical evidence not discussed by the court. For a general
study of the matter, see Peterson, Negotiated vs. Competitive Debt Financing, 1 VAND. L.
REv. 531 (1948).
104. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
105. See, e.g., Transcript of Record, p. 22,797, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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business, that would suffice;100 the absence of any other must be due to the
necessities of the business, which Government counsel were said not to under-
stand anyway.
Perhaps it was the court's acceptance of this argument, fallacy and all, which
accounts for his strange disregard of the price-competition charge. The opinion
is replete with references to competition at some point or other for leadership,
and the competition is said to be "intense" for positions in buying groups, but
one may search the opinion from stem to stem without finding more than one
or two brief references to price-competition on the part of the defendants. There
being virtually no competition of the sort-aside from public sealed bidding-
the court may simply have regarded that fact as one of the natural conditions
of the business.10 7 It just happened that way, perhaps.
The court virtually says as much. Half way through the opinion, under the
heading, "The 'Master Mind,' " he makes this comment: under "the old, estab-
lished way of conducting the investment banking business, which had slowly
grown up functionally over the years," the "major part of the competitive effort
of investment bankers generally was devoted to an attempt to establish relation-
ships with issuers.'1 0 8 That is, to the establishment of continuing banker-client
relationships, even as the Government had alleged. But, even here, a banker
does not seek to push himself in; rather, he waits to be "invited." Then the
court leaps to the conclusion: "That is why there is so little price competition
after the issues have been shaped up .... ,,109 And, that is the end of the matter;
the business simply is not done that way.
It is odd that so astute a judge as judge Medina did not see through such
nonsense, a standard defense technique.110 Stanley certainly made his attitude
toward price-competition explicit enough. In the letter-not discussed by the
court-which Stanley wrote upon withdrawing from the St. Louis Terminal
business, he said, in part: "We believe that terms arrived at through direct
negotiations between the borrowing corporation and its bankers, selected by it
as competent judges of credit and of market conditions, are more likely to be
right than those arrived at in the heat of a competitive struggle of dealers to
overreach each other in the desire for business." Such "competitive methods,"
106. By happy chance even the "show window" competition of Kuhn, Loeb & Co. could
meet this test. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 754-7 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
107. In Exhibit 198, Transcript of Record, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp.
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), Stanley makes the same point, but he goes one step farther: "I
grant right off the bat that there is not the same kind of competition in the financing
of securities as there is in bricks and mortars and shoes, and whatever else. I don't belie,
there should be. I don't think it is appropriate." (Italics added). This statement vas made
at a hearing before the SEC in 1941. The Commission wvas seeking to determine whether
there was full competition for the purchase of public utility securities, and decided in the
negative. Rule U-50 was the outcome.
108. United States v. Iorgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
109. Ibid. (italics added).
110. One of the best illustrations of the strategy is United States v. Aluminum Com-
pany of America, 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), re'd, 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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he continued, "tend to overpricing the issue to the investor and to subsequent
dissatisfaction and loss of credit and go6d will of the borrower.""' And, he
might have added, give a less sure profit to the bankers.
Here was no illusion that the defendants' traditional-banker way of doing
business-without price-competition-is merely the result of "functional"
growth over the years. It was the defendants-not necessity-who carefully
nurtured the ideas that the banker occupies a dual role, as professional ad-
viser, and also as merchant; and that any banker would be doing an unfriendly
act to interfere with the first role, while, as to the second, the issuer does not
really want the last penny for his securities anyway. So, if the result has been
no price-competition, and only a minimum of plan-competition, with securities
flowing issue after issue in the same general channels, it must have been the
defendants who "planned it that way." Who else?
Stanley, in fact, would have the banker occupy still a third role, that of
"umpire." 1 2 It should also be the banker's function, he said, to see to it that
terms are "right,"11 3 in order to protect investors. The evidence before judge
Medina-not referred to by him-showed that this meant, as a matter of dollars
and cents, that the public offering price should be so set that, upon distribution
of the securities, they would appreciate in price by, say, one-eighth or perhaps
a quarter point," 4 something quite impossible to bring about in a truly com-
petitive market. However laudable this plan might be, it too was plainly not
a matter of necessity. And, quite as plainly, it violated the congressional coin-
111. Copy of letter from Stanley to Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis dated
July 5, 1939, Exhibit 193, Transcript of Record, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) (italics added). Judge Medina, no doubt facetiously, has commented
elsewhere: "When you write an opinion no one can make you put in something you want
to leave out. You can readily see how this simplifies the process." Medina, Before Ascend.
jag the Bench-and After, 29 MIcx. ST. BAR J. 5 (1950). And again in 1952 he said:
"Anyway, this opinion writing has a perfect fascination for me. Part of the joy is that no
one can make you put in something that you want to leave out." Medina, Some Reflections
on the Judicial Functiom: A Personal Viewpoint, 38 A.B.A.J. 107, 109 (1952).
112. Exhibit 85, introduced on May 24, 1951, Transcript of Record, p. 7613, United
States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Speaking of private placements,
Stanley said they caused "the loss of whatever value there is-and we think it is substantial
-in having a third party, i.e., the investment banker, stand as an uimpire between the
borrower and the investor." (Italics added).
113. Exhibit 193, supra note 111.
114. This was testified to by Swan and also, in substance, by Sachs. Transcript of
Record, p. 17,790, United States v. Morgan, 1.18 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Later,
when Stanley was asked whether it was the practice of his firm to price an issue so that
it would appreciate during the first four weeks or more of its distribution, he said: "The
answer is no. We did not know what it was going to do in the market." As a matter of
practice, however, a tabulation before the court (which had been prepared by Stanley's
firm) showed that in the five year period, 1936-1940, with respect to a total of some
$2,000,000,000 of securities managed by Morgan Stanley & Co., there had been a small
average appreciation in each of the four weeks following the public offering. See Trans-
cript of Record, p. 7126, United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
[Vol. 64:169
THE INVESTMENT BANKERS' CASE
mand, that the market, not a banker in the guise of umpire, should determine
when prices and terms are fair and right.11
Some Final Obscrvations
It has not been possible to consider in much detail whether the Government
actually made out a prima facie case, as seems to be true. Necessarily, the
inquiry has had to deal largely with the preliminary question, whether the court
ever ruled upon the case as alleged in the complaint, and as presented in evi-
dence. With all due respect to the learned court, the answer to that must be
no. It would be hard, in fact, to conceive of any more flagrant error of law
than the court committed, when, in disregard of the "charges" set forth in
Paragraph 43, he proceeded to dispose of the several "means" alleged in the
complaint in piecemeal fashion, each in turn as if it were the offense charged.
The case must necessarily have been reversed on appeal.
This raises the question: Why was no appeal taken? The case plainly was
not the "lost cause," that Judge Barnes said it was. And, surely, he must have
understood that, as a precedent, the case would greatly encourage the defendant
bankers in their noncompetitive ways of doing business. What the decision
will mean to the industrial issuer who might wish to sell his securities in a
truly competitive market is impossible to say. But, to the extent that the reduc-
tion in banker's fees brought about by compulsory competitive bidding in the
utility field is an index, it may well run into millions of dollars. The Govern-
ment's inaction, also, must have brought "joy" to the bankers.
On the resale side, too, the decision can only result in mischief. All of the
hundreds of price maintenance clauses, penalties, stabilization practices, and so
on, which were before the court, were held to be lawful, without any exception.
True, this part of the opinion was, amazingly enough, labelled "dictum."110
And, it was recognized that some practices "in the future" as "in the past"
might be unlawful. 1 7 But, nevertheless, the court ruled broadly that: "the
fixed-price type of public offering of new securities viewed in the large, and on
the basis of methods now in common use by the investment banking industry,
gives no offense to the Sherman Act."
1 8
Judge Medina had two legs to his argument. The first, that resale price
maintenance agreements, penalty clauses, and such are all within "the rule of
115. In the days prior to the SEC it definitely ,as the role of the investment banker,
as Stanley says, to take public responsibility for the character of the securities he brought
out. And, of course, it still is, but in much lesser degree. It as largely because Congress
felt that the banking fraternity had failcd in that role that the Securities Act Vas passed.
Today the investor-and syndicate members as well-have far more accurate information
available to them concerning a new security than they ever had before. For the same reason
it may now be time to recognize that the old hand-tailored, continuing-banker way of
marketing securities, as a professional service, must give way to a less costly, more com-
petitive, large scale merchandising operation.
116. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 6S6 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
117. Id. at 691.
118. Ibid.
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reason," as declared by the Chicago Board of Trade 110 case, need not detain
us. It openly flouts the many later cases, 120 properly called to his attention,
which have said, with emphasis, that any tampering with price is per se
illegal.' 21 But the second leg should have given the Assistant Attorney-General
even more concern. This was the contention that the Securities Act and related
legislation have wholly exempted the investment banking industry from any
need to comply with the Sherman Act,12 2 at least in the resale price area.
Probably the court here too was wrong, for "implied repeals" have not been
regarded favorably by the Supreme Court.1 23 But, whether so or not, as a
matter of orderly government, questions of such importance surely should not
be left in unnecessary doubt.
In short, the Government appears to have had no rational basis for its failure
to file an appeal. It would have been in the public interest, it seems, if only a
single issue of procedure had been brought up, that is, whether any trial court
can accord the plaintiff a fair trial, if, before the plaintiff has had an opportunity
to offer any evidence whatever, the court listens, as Judge Medina did, for
nearly four months to opening statements by defense counsel.' 24 The Govern-
ment's action in quitting here too, without firing a shot, must surely plague
antitrust law for some time to come.
119. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
120. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951), and cases there
cited.
121. The point is ably discussed in Note, The Investnent Bankers Case: The Use of
Semantics to Avoid the Per Se Illegality of Price Fixing, 63 YALE L.J. 399 (1954).
122. The court said: "The plain truth of the matter is that the legal questions now
under discussion form an area of head-on collision between the SEC on the one hand and
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice on the other." United States v. Morgan,
118 F. Supp. 621, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Company, 308 U.S. 188 (1939). In fact, Judge
Medina agreed, for he said that the Securities Act did not give "an implied exemption in
whole or in part" from the Sherman Act. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 697
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). But he then went on to say without any support from the record, aside
from the assertions of defense counsel, that: "The real point is that all those who worked
together on the formulation of this most significant and beneficial legislation went about
their task of integrating into the statutory pattern the current modes of bringing out new
security issues then in common use by investment bankers generally, with complete assur-
ance that no violation of the Sherman Act was even remotely involved." There was thus
no implied exemption, which is bad, but merely an implied approval, which to the court,
apparently, was something very different.
124. The court did a good job in having the plaintiff's proposed exhibits printed in
advance of trial, and approved by defense counsel as to genuineness. That saved much court
room time. But it was surely reversible error to permit, if not encourage, defense counsel
thereafter, in their opening statements, to range far and wide to explain them away. The
time honored practice has been for the plaintiff first to put in his case, when it can be seen
as a whole. The defendants then have their day in court, when their case can be made out
with admissible documents and swor testimony subject to cross-examination.
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